By Anne Luyat, Université d'Avignon
John G. Peters. Conrad
and Impressionism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001. 206pp. £45
The subject of impressionism has attracted
gifted Conrad scholars from Ramon Fernandez to John Dozier Gordan
and Ian Watt, critics whose writings have become part of the canon
of literary research. Conrad
and Impressionism, a systematic
and thorough study of the relationship between seeing and knowing
in Conrad's work, perpetuates this tradition of excellence. John
G. Peters treats impressionism in painting and in literature in
order to evaluate their impact on Conrad's philosophical and political
views as well as on his literary techniques.
Quoting from Conrad in "Heart of Darkness":
"I know that the sunlight can be made to lie," he indicates that
Conrad recognized the limits of impressionism and consciously sought
to go beyond them after finishing The
Nigger of the "Narcissus." Conrad's
conception of reality as essentially indeterminate, evolving and
unfinished, extended far beyond the confines of impressionism in
literature and painting. Chapter II is entitled "Objects and events
in the 'primitive eye': the epistemology of objectivity" and deals
with no less a subject than the nature of reality in a world of
precarity.
As Conrad realized, the relationship
between seeing and knowing was more complex than the technical analysis
of physical perceptions, hence his profound interest in point of
view as both an objective and subjective phenomenon. As Peters points
out, the limited point of view in Conrad "can refer to the physical
location in space from which the perception occurs but it can also
include the influence of the observer's personal and public past
on perception."
He goes on to discuss the links between
perceptions and delayed decoding as well as the sequences so often
to be found in Conrad's writing of initial and later perceptions
of the same objects, such as the moment when Marlow's perception
of seemingly harmless "flying sticks" in "Heart of Darkness"
becomes the sudden realization of mortal danger in the deadly "flying
arrows" as he attempts to reach Kurtz. Mimesis has become a subjective
phenomenon. Conrad is no longer imitating reality but transforming
it.
In Chapter III, entitled "The Epistemology
of Objectivity," we learn how Conrad came to realize that objective
knowledge is actually relative knowledge, for "not only do the boundaries
between objects blur but so do the boundaries between perceiving
object and perceived subject. Subjects can alter objects just as
objects can alter subjects." In his portrayal of perceptions as
continually evolving and changing, Conrad represents the uncertainty
of being able to obtain objective knowledge and the extreme difficulty
of knowing with any certainty. The view of objective knowledge becomes
in this light a relative one and as a consequence, western absolutes
no longer have the same force in Conrad's writing as they did in
the writing of his predecessors.
If objective knowledge is elusive and
difficult to ascertain, so is subjective knowledge, both of oneself
and of others. In Chapter IV, "The Epistemology of Subjectivity,"
John Peters discusses Conrad's admission that it is as difficult
to know oneself as to know others. As Conrad wrote to Edward Garnett,
"One's own personality is something hopelessly unknown." The attempt
to know another leads to Marlow's bafflement in Lord
Jim: "How incomprehensible, wavering
and misty are the beings that share with us the sight of the stars
and the warmth of the sun," a conception of the precarious nature
of all perceptions and all knowledge that at the end of the twentieth
century the French critic Jean Baudrillard would describe as perceiving
"the unreality of the real."
In "The Epistemology of Temporality"
not only have objective knowledge and subjective knowledge become
relative quantities, so has time itself.
Peters believes that human time appears in two forms in Conrad's
works, as personal time and as cyclical time. Both personal time
and cyclical time blur the boundaries between subjective time and
context and create a conception of the flow of human existence which
is extremely flexible, one that adds to its precarious nature and
makes the difficulty of acquiring objective knowledge even greater.
In the final chapter, "Conrad's Impressionist
Response to Solipsism and Anarchy," Peters discusses Conrad's need
to create meaning in a relative and uncertain universe and to come
to terms with conceptions based on relative rather than objective
or absolute values. Can one society justify its values over another?
Can consensus among members of society concerning moral values avoid
the abyss of ethical anarchy: "If Conrad's works are tragic," he
indicates in the epilogue, "their tragedy lies in their recognition
of the failure of an absolute world while still clinging to the
conventions of that world."
Conrad and Impressionism
is remarkable for its carefully composed logical structure and the
precision of its arguments as well as for the well chosen definitions
and examples which render the complex philosophical and ethical
concerns of Conrad. John G. Peters has made a valuable contribution
to Conrad studies, one upon which future scholars can build with
assurance. The notes and bibliography alone qualify the book for
a prominent place on our bookshelves.
© 2006 Anne Luyat
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